Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts of Economic Growth by Reto Foellmi & Josef Zweilmueller
Structural Change, Engel’s Consumption Cycles
and Kaldor’s Facts of Economic Growth
Reto Foellmi, University of Zurich Josef Zweim¨ uller, University of Zurich∗
December 2 0, 2005
Abstract
The model presented in this paper reconciles two of the most important features of
the long-run growth process: the massive changes in the structure of production and em-
ployment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. Structural change occurs because
Engel-curves are non-linear. Each new good goes through Engel’s consumption cycle, i.e.
starts out as a luxury with a high income elasticity and ends up as a necessity with a low
income elasticity. The coexistence of stagnating and expanding industries imply a chang-
ing sectoral composition and a continuous reallocation of labor across sectors. Nonetheless
macroeconomic aggregates grow at a constant rate, and the real interest rate and the labor
share are constant. Our model also addresses the two-way causality between economic
growth and structural change. Complementarities between aggregate and sectoral growth
may give rise to multiple equilibria providing a possible explanation for development fail-
ures.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The process of economic development is characterized by fundamental changes in the structure
of production and employment. In a historical perspective, the emergence of new and the
decline of old industries has led to a dramatic reallocation of resources between sectors of
production.1 Despite of these large structural changes, the long-term growth process has been
remarkably stable in the aggregate. As mentioned by Kaldor (1961) in his famous stylized
facts, a situation where the growth rate, interest rate, capital output ratio, and labor share
are constant over time is a reasonable approximation of the long-run growth experience of a
modern economy.
Changes in the structure of production and employment result either from sectoral dif-
ferences in productivity growth or from sectoral diﬀerences in income elasticities of demand.
This paper focuses on the demand side. Our starting point is the basic idea that consumption
expands along a hierarchy of needs and wants. This idea goes at least back to Plato and
has played an important role in the thinking of classical economists. The German statistician
Ernst Engel (1857) pioneered the empirical analysis of consumption patterns. Engel’s law -
the falling budget share for food with rising incomes - has become one the most robust empir-
ical ﬁndings in economics (Houthakker, 1987). But Engel (1857) himself believed in a more
general law of consumption and formulated a theory of a equilibrium structure of production
and employment based on a hierarchy of wants.2 This view has been supported by many later
writers. For instance, Kindleberger (1989, p. 9) argues
”Engel’s law applies to more than food, it is a general law of consumption. (...)
A given item may go through the Engel’s consumption cycle of a luxury, with high
income elasticity, to a necessity with low income elasticity.”
Modern growth theory has been surprisingly silent on the issue of how to reconcile the
1Maddison (1987) documents the huge reallocation of lab o ri ns i xm a j o ri n d u s t r i a l i z e dc o u n t r i e s( F r a n c e ,
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, U.K. and U.S.). His data show that the average employment share in agriculture
was as high as 46.0 % in 1870 and has decreased to 5.5 % by 1984. During the same period the average
employment share in the service sector has increased from 26.4 % to 62.2 %.
2Engel (1857) concluded explicitely from his empirical analysis that needs have a hierarchic structure: ”Nun-
mehr (ist) gleichsam eine Scala der Bed¨ urfnisse des Lebens zu Tage gef¨ ordert (p. 27).”The idea that, in the age
of mass consumption, the very concept of necessities and luxuries has changed, has been stressed by Katona
(1964). See also the discussion on Engel-curves in Pasinetti (1981, Chapter IV).
2huge structural changes with the Kaldor facts of economic growth. The ﬁrst paper that has
explicitly addressed the issue is Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001). They study a three-sector
model where consumers have Stone-Geary preferences over an agricultural good (a necessity),
a manufactured good (with an income-elasticity near unity), and services (a luxury). They
ﬁnd that a ”generalized balanced growth path”, along which the Kaldor facts are satisﬁed,
is only possible if preference and technology parameters jointly satisfy a knife-edge condition.
Just like in Kongsamut et al. (2001), in our model structural change is driven by sectoral
diﬀerences in income elasticities. Unlike Kongsamut et al. (2001), however, our model studies
a continuum of products and reconciles structural change and the Kaldor facts without putting
joint restrictions on technology and preference parameters.
To the best of our knowledge, other papers rationalizing structural change and steady
growth in a uniﬁed framework have focused exclusively on technological diﬀerences across
sectors. In Ngai and Pissarides (2005) sectors experience diﬀerent total factor productivity
growth rates (but have identical capital-intensities). They show that the aggregate growth
process satisﬁes the Kaldor facts if the intertemporal utility function is logarithmic in the
consumption composite; and the consumption composite is non-logarithmic (yet homothetic)
across goods. Another recent paper by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005) does not only allow
for diﬀerent rates of technical progress but also for diﬀerences in capital intensities across
sectors. In a two-sector growth model with constant elasticity of substitution preferences and
Cobb-Douglas production technologies they show that, provided the elasticity of substitution
is less than one, convergence to the limiting equilibrium may be slow and along the transition
path (when the sectoral structure changes) the capital share and the interest rate vary only by
relatively small amounts hence reconciling structural change with the Kaldor facts.3
3Starting with Baumol (1967) an important strand of the literature views structural change as a supply
phenomenon. Sectors with low technical progress suﬀer from the ”cost disease”, i.e. rising relative costs and
prices. When relative output levels of stagnant and dynamic sectors remain roughly constant (due to limited
substitutability between products), the Kaldor facts are necessarily violated. Recently other authors have
studied models where relative productivity between the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors determine
patterns of the structural transformation without accounting for the Kaldor facts. See Hansen and Presott
(2002), Parente and Prescott (2004). See also the endogenous growth models by Young (1993a, 1993b) where
changes in the structure of production arising from sector-speciﬁc learning-by-doing and/or complementarities
among old and new technologies; by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) where asymmetries arise from lags in the
diﬀusion of new technologies; and by Thompson (2001) where quality uncertainty in connection with rising
3In contrast to these technology-based approaches, our model relies on Engel’s consumption
cycles to account for structural change. In this framework the fundamental cause of structural
change is the hierarchic nature of wants.4 During the process of economic growth, consumers
get saturated with existing products. In order to sustain growth new goods (covering new
wants) have to be continuously introduced. To highlight the demand-channel and to keep
things simple we abstract from technological diﬀerences across sectors. However, we discuss in
a separate section how various dimensions of technological heterogeneity can be incorporated
in our model without substantially changing our main message.
Our analysis leads to the following results. First, the hierarchic nature of demand implies
that structural change takes the form of a reallocation of resources from old to new industries.
At any given date old industries supply necessities and new industries supply luxuries. These
sectors experience diﬀerent growth rates of demand and a reallocation of resources is necessary
to satisfy these demands. The Engel-curve of a typical good is non-linear: demand is zero at
very low income levels, becomes positive when a critical income level has been surpassed and
approaches a saturation point when incomes grow large. As an implication, a product’s income
elasticity is initially high and gradually decreases with growing income. In other words, each
good starts oﬀ as a luxury with a high income elasticity and ends up as a necessity with a
low income elasticity. Hence our model formalizes the Engel-Kindleberger idea of consumption
cycles.
Second, along the long-run growth path the Kaldor facts are satisﬁed. Prima facie recon-
ciling non-linear Engel-curves and the Kaldor facts seems to be non-trivial. However, just as
a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution is required for steady growth in a one-good
economy, a constant intertemporal substitution elasticity of total consumption expenditures is
required in our framework where there are many goods. along the balanced growth path total
consumption expenditures grow at the same rate as total output. However, along this path
the level of demand for a particular product does not grow at the economy-wide growth rate.
product variety leads to a non-degenerate ﬁrm size distribution. In these models, the demand-side plays a
p a s s i v er o l ea sp r e f e r e n c e sb e t w e e nt h ev a rious goods are assumed to be symmetric.
4A related literature has studied the implications of non-homothetic preferences and non-linear Engel curves
for structural change in models that do not account for the Kaldor facts (e.g. Matsuyama, 1992, 2002, Echevarria,
1997, Laitner, 2000, Caselli and Coleman, 2001, Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson, 2002, 2004, Greenwood and
Uysal, 2005). For an overview on recent theories of structural change see Matsuyama (2005).
4New goods experience a higher increase in demand than old goods involving a transfer of labor
resources from old to new industries. By featuring a steady growth path our analysis provides a
natural extension of the one-sector growth model to a multi-sector set-up in which preferences
over the various goods have a hierarchical structure.
Third, the evolution of consumption along a hierarchy of wants highlights the importance
of product innovations for sustaining growth. When consumers get satiated with existing
products, demand for the satisfaction of new wants arises. New goods have to be continuously
introduced to ensure that demand keeps pace with technical progress. When growth is driven
by such innovations, an important two-way causality between growth and structural change
arises. On the one hand, the aggregate growth rate depends on structural change because
innovation incentives are crucially determined by the growth rates in the new industries. On
the other hand, the speed of structural change is itself determined by aggregate growth. To
highlight this interdependence between growth and structural change, we present our model
in the context of a standard endogenous growth framework a la Romer (1990) and Grossman
and Helpman (1992). In this context, we show that the above complementarities between
sectoral and aggregate growth may give rise to multiple equilibria: When innovators expect
a disproportionate increase in demand for new products, incentives to innovate are strong
and vice versa. Expectations are self-fulﬁlling as high sectoral growth requires high aggregate
growth which can only be sustained in an innovative environment.
Fourth, though the main purpose of the paper is theoretical, we provide a simple quanti-
tative exercise to confront our model with historical data for the U.S. and other industrialized
countries. We interpret our model in the context of the sectoral trichotomy (agriculture, manu-
facturing, services) by assuming that the most urgent wants are satisﬁed by agricultural goods,
the less urgent ones by manufactures and the most luxurious ones by services. We show that
our model ﬁts the data quite well. In particular, the model predicts a movement of labor out of
agriculture of an order of magnitude that is observed in OECD data. The model also predicts
an the evolution of the manufacturing labor share follows an inverse U: the manufacturing
labor share increases in earlier stages of development and declines in later stages which is also
in line with the experience in most OECD countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the general set-up of the model,
solve the static problem of consumers and ﬁrms, and discuss the resulting structures of demand
5and prices. Section 3 outlines our assumptions on technical progress, the innovation incentives
of ﬁrms, and the optimal allocation of expenditures by consumers. Section 4 characterizes
the conditions under which a unique equilibrium growth path exists. In Section 5 we discuss
the co-existence of structural change and the Kaldor facts. Section 6 provides a discussion of
the possibility of multiple equilibria. In Section 7 we look in some detail at the robustness of
our results with respect to the basic assumptions, in particular, heterogeneity in technologies
across sectors. Section 8 calibrates our model to data of six industrialized countries. Section
9 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2 The Static Equilibrium
2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
Consider a representative agent economy with inﬁnitely many potentially producible goods






where v(c(i)) is an indicator for the utility derived from consuming good i in quantity c. The
’baseline’ utility v(c(i)) satisﬁes the usual assumptions v0 > 0a n dv00 < 0; and the ’hierarchy’
function ξ(i) is monotonically decreasing in i, ξ0(i) < 0, hence low-i goods get a higher weight
than high-i goods.
A meaningful speciﬁcation of hierarchic preferences has to take account of two facts. First,
some goods may not be consumed because the consumer cannot aﬀord them. This implies
that preferences must be such that the non-negativity constraints may become binding and
Engel-curves for the various goods are non-linear. Formally, binding non-negativity constraints
require that the marginal utility of consuming good i in quantity zero, ξ(i)v0(0) is ﬁnite for all
i>0. If marginal utility at quantity zero were inﬁnitely large, it would always be optimal to
consume a (small) positive amount even when prices are very high and/or the budget is very
low.5
5Non-negativity constraints never become binding in the standard monopolistic competition model (Dixit
and Stiglitz (1978)) that dominates the macroeconomic literature. In that model v(c(i)) =
1
αc(i)
α, α < 1, and
v
0(0) = ∞. Thus in the standard monopolistic competition model all available goods are consumed in positive
6Second, the generalized version of Engel’s law implies that additional income is spent pri-
marily on low-priority goods (high income elasticity). This feature is caught by the formulation
that the utility of consumption of diﬀerent goods diﬀers only in the factor ξ(i). As the hier-
archy function ξ(i) is decreasing in i the marginal utility of a high priority good (low i)f a l l s
quickly. Optimal consumer behavior implies that additional income is spent primarily on the
low-priority goods with slowly falling marginal utilities.
To keep the analysis tractable we make two assumptions concerning the functional forms of
the weighting function ξ(i) and the baseline utility v(c(i)). First we assume that the weighting
function is a power function ξ(i)=i−γ with γ ∈ (0,1). Second, we assume that the baseline
utility is quadratic, v(c(i)) = 1
2[s2 − (s − c(i))2]. This speciﬁcation allows for binding non-
negativity constraints as marginal utility at quantity zero is ﬁnite, ξ(i)v0(0) = i−γ 1
2s2 < ∞,
for all goods i>0. The ﬁrst assumption is essential for a dynamic equilibrium featuring the
Kaldor facts and to a CRRA utility in the one-good growth model. We will see that, just as
the CRRA-form is required to generate balanced growth in the one-good growth model, the
weighting function ξ(i)=i−γ is required for steady growth with many, hierarchically ordered
goods. The second assumption, however, is not essential. While the quadratic subutility
function allows for explicit solutions (and binding non-negativity constraints), it can be shown
that our analysis holds for any other subutility function (see Foellmi, 2003). In Section 8 we
discuss these conditions in more detail.6
With these assumptions, we can now specify the objective function of the consumer’s static
maximization problem. Assume that only goods with high priority i ∈ [0,N]a r ea v a i l a b l e
on the market, whereas all i>Nhave not yet been invented. In that case the consumers’
amounts.
6In this sense, our formulation of preferences provides a natural extension of the one-sector framework to a
framework with hierachic preferences. In particular, our formulation does not require any link between preference







[s2 − (s − c(i))2] di. (1)
which will be maximized subject to the budget constraint
R ∞
0 p(i)c(i)di = E and the non-
negativity constraints c(i) ≥ 0 for all i. The optimality conditions require that the above
constraints and the ﬁrst order conditions
c(i)
£
i−γ(s − c(i)) − λp(i)
¤
=0 ∀i (2)
i−γ(s − c(i)) − λp(i) ≤ 0 ∀i.
be satisﬁed, where λ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier.
2.2 Prices
We assume there are constant marginal cost in production, equal for all goods, and we normalize
these marginal costs to unity. Goods i ∈ [0,aN] are supplied on competitive markets and
goods i ∈ (aN,N] are supplied by monopolistic ﬁrms. This means that high priority (low-i)
goods are supplied by competitive producers and low priority (high-i) goods are supplied by
monopolists.8
The prices for goods in the interval i ∈ [0,aN]a r ee q u a lt om a r g i n a lc o s t sw h i c ha r e
unity. Determining the prices for the goods i ∈ (aN,N] is less trivial but straightforward.
The market demand function is given by the representative household’s optimality condi-




2 − (s − c(i))
2] has been normalized such that v(0) = 0. This normalization is necessary to
prevent divergence of the utility integral because the consumer’s preferences are deﬁned over an inﬁnite number
of goods. Since only goods in the interval i ∈ [0,N] can be consumed in positive amounts the consumer’s












2]di. To prevent divergence
of the ﬁrst integral we must have γ < 1. By the normalization of v(.) the second integral is zero and does not





2 − (s − c(i))
2]di.
8While this particular structure is an assumption at this stage, we will see below that it will be the equilibrium
outcome of the model. Over time new goods are continuously introduced and the chronological sequence of
innovations follows the hierarchy of wants. When innovators are protected by patent with ﬁnite duration, the
’new ’goods are protected and charged the monopoly price, whereas the patents for ’old’ goods have expired
a n ds u p p l i e do nc o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t s .







for i ∈ (aN,N]. (3)
2.3 Equilibrium composition of demand and the structure of prices
We can now characterize the composition of demand and the structure of prices in the static
equilibrium, given the representative agent’s budget E and the measure of available goods N.
This will be done separately for the two scenarios that can occur in equilibrium. In the ﬁrst
case, the consumer cannot aﬀord all supplied goods because the non-negativity constraints
for low-priority goods become binding. In the second case, the consumer is rich enough to
purchase all goods that are supplied on the market. We discuss these two cases in turn. (The
conditions under which the two respective regimes occur are studied in Section 5 below.)
When the consumer does not purchase all available goods, the measure of consumed prod-
ucts falls short of the measure of available goods N. If good i is consumed in positive amounts
and supplied at the monopoly price, we know from (2) and (3) that the consumed quantity
equals c(i)=1
2 (s − iγλ). The equilibrium demand is decreasing in i which means that the
optimal quantity of low-priority goods is smaller. It also means that there is a good, call it
n, such that for goods i>nthe optimal level of demand is zero whereas all goods i<nare
consumed in positive amounts. It turns out convenient to express the endogenous variables
c(i)a n dp(i) in terms of the endogenous variable n rather than λ. From c(n)=1
2 (s − nγλ)=0
it is straightforward to calculate λ = s
nγ. Substituting this into equations (2) and (3) we get
the equilibrium composition of demand, and the equilibrium structure of prices
c(i)=

   





















   












According to equations (4) and (5), what matters for prices and quantities is the relative
position in the hierarchy of needs, i/n. We also see that the ’steeper’ the hierarchy (the higher
9is γ) the more important is the relative position. The above expressions for p(i)a n dc(i)
are determined for a given measure of consumed goods n. However, n itself is an endogenous






















This equation implicitly deﬁnes the number of consumed goods n as a function of expenditures
E, available goods N, and other parameters of the model.9 In particular, we note that E and
N are exogenous from the point of view of the consumer. Moreover, we see from the above
equation that n is homogenous of degree one in E and N:w h e nE and N increase by some
factor, the equilibrium value of n increases by the same factor.
Now consider the alternative scenario that the consumer chooses to consume all available
goods in positive amounts. Obviously, this is the case if c(N)=1
2 (s − Nγλ) > 0. Also here
it is convenient to replace λ. However, we cannot express λ in terms of the optimal bundle of
consumed goods n which is trivially determined by the number of available goods N. Instead
we express λ in terms of the price of the good that has least priority in consumption, that is
by the endogenous variable p(N) ≡ p. From (3) it is straightforward to express the marginal
utility of income as λ = s
Nγ(2p−1). The same expression (3) can be used to express the monopoly





(2p −1)]. The structure of



























¢γ (2p − 1)],i ∈ (aN,N].
(5’)
9It is straightforward to verify that the right-hand-side of (6) is monotonically increasing in n.W h e n n o
intersection occurs for n ≤ N, the equilibrium is characterized by n = N. In that case equation (6’) below is
relevant. Note that when, respectively, n = N and p = 1, the right-hand-sides of the equations (6) and (6’)
become identical.
10Note that, in equilibrium, a higher p means higher prices for all goods and this goes hand
in hand with higher equilibrium consumption for all goods. The reason for this apparently
strange result is that the equilibrium depends crucially on the consumer’s budget E relative
to the measure of supplied goods N. If E is large relative to N, there is high demand for each
good which means that monopolists can charge high prices.
The variables c(i)a n dp(i) are determined by the endogenous variable p, the proﬁt-
maximizing price chosen by the monopolist who supplies the good N. Just like before, the
equilibrium depends on the consumer’s budget E, the measure of available goods N, and other
parameters of the model. To see the relationship between p, E, and N, we insert equations
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This expression implicitly deﬁnes p as a function of E, N, and other parameters of the model.
We observe that p is homogenous of degree zero in E and N:w h e nE and N grow pari passu,
p remains unchanged.
3 The Dynamics of the Economy
3.1 Technical Progress an dt h eR e s o u r c eB a s e
To keep things simple we develop our arguments assuming that labor is the only production
factor. (In Section 6 below we discuss the more general case when not only labor but also
physical capital is used in production.) Production requires a ﬁxed (’innovation’ or ’research’)
input of ˜ F(t) units of labor, and a variable labor input of ˜ b(t) per unit of output (t denotes
a continuous time index). Denoting by w(t) the wage rate, we have innovation costs w(t) ˜ F(t)
and marginal costs of production w(t)˜ b(t). We assume ˜ b(t)= b
A(t) and ˜ F(t)= F
A(t), where
A(t) is the aggregate knowledge stock, and F,b > 0 are exogenous parameters. These as-
sumptions imply that productivity growth, an increase in A(t), is uniform across sectors and
also across activities. Assuming uniform productivity growth across products makes sure that
all heterogeneity comes from the demand side which is the focus of our analysis. Assuming
uniform productivity growth across (production and research) activities is important for the
existence of a constant growth path. Along this path wages grow with productivity so that
11marginal production costs w(t)b(t) and innovation costs w(t) ˜ F(t) are constant over time. In
what follows we take marginal cost as the numeraire, hence w(t)˜ b(t) = 1 for all t.
In accordance with much of the endogenous growth literature we assume that the aggregate
knowledge stock is proxied by the amount of previous innovations activities. These consist of
the measure of goods that are actually available on the market, so we have A(t)=N(t)a n d
˜ b(t)= b
N(t) and ˜ F(t)= F
N(t).10
The labor force is normalized to 1 and, in equilibrium, there is full employment. At date t,
˙ N(t) new goods are introduced and the necessary employment level to perform the innovation
input is ˙ N(t) F














3.2 The Innovation Process
Innovations occur because ﬁrms are granted patents and earn proﬁts as long as their market
is protected from competitors. The value of an innovation that occurs at date t, Π(t), equals
t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h ep r o ﬁt ﬂow that accrues to the innovating ﬁrm. This ﬂow starts at the
date when consumers begin to purchase this product and ends when patents have expired. We
denote the ﬂow proﬁta td a t eτ of the date-t innovator (the ﬁrm which produces good N(t))
by π(N(t),τ)=[ p(N(t),τ) − 1] c(N(t),τ).
When consumers purchase all available varieties n = N the date-t innovator earns positive
proﬁts right from the start, that is throughout the interval [t,t + ∆] where the exogenous
policy parameter ∆ denotes the duration of the patent. When consumers cannot aﬀord all
available varieties n<N ,the innovator has initially no demand. Consumers purchase only
10Note that our assumption on knowledge spillovers diﬀers from the standard ’love-for-variety’ model (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1992). In that model productivity grows only in research but not in production. In the
hierarchical model instead there has to be technical progress otherwise innovations comes to a halt because con-
sumers are not willing to reduce consumption on high-priority goods if new goods come along. Hence without
technical progress in production, sooner or later the whole labor force will be employed to satisfy the demand of
consumers on the already existing goods. Our assumption could be justiﬁed, e.g., using the argument of Young
(1993a): If the invention of a new good i leads as a by-product to the discovery of a new intermediate input
and if the ﬁnal goods are produced by combining these inputs using a constant returns to scale CES technology,
the productivity of the output sector rises linearly in the number of these inputs.
12the goods with high priority, that is all goods in the interval [0,n(t)) and no goods in the
interval [n(t),N(t)]. In that case, innovators have a waiting time until consumers are willing
to purchase their product. Denoting this waiting time by δ, the proﬁt ﬂow π(N(t),τ) is zero
at dates τ ∈ [t,t + δ], positive at all dates τ ∈ (t+δ,t+∆], and zero for τ >t+∆. To see how
δ is determined note that, when consumers start to buy good N(t)a td a t et + δ, N(t)i st h e
good with least priority in the consumption bundle. Hence δ is given by n(t+δ)=N(t). In the
dynamic equilibrium n(t) grows at the constant rate g and we have n(t+δ)=n(t)eδg = N(t).
Innovation costs are constant over time and given by wF. Assuming free access to the
research sector, there is entry as long as innovation costs fall short of the value of an innovation.
Hence in equilibrium, when all proﬁt opportunities are exploited, we must have wF ≥ Π(t),
with strict equality whenever innovations take place. Deﬁning R(τ,t)=
R τ
t r(s)ds as the




[p(N(t),τ) − 1] c(N(t),τ) e−R(τ,t)dτ. (8)
3.3 Optimal Savings
We now consider the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption expenditures of the
representative consumer. Assuming that an agent maximizes utility over an inﬁnite horizon,










2[s2 − (s − c(i,τ))2]di is the aggregator for within-period consumption
levels. The parameter σ measures the willingness to shift the composite u(τ)a c r o s st i m ea n d
ρ is the subjective rate of time preference. The above objective function is maximized subject






w(τ)e−R(τ,t)dτ + V (t),
where E(τ) ≡
R N(τ)
0 p(i,τ)c(i,τ)di denotes the level of consumption expenditures at date τ and
V (t) denotes the assets that the consumer owns at the initial date t. Setting up the Lagrangian
and taking derivatives with respect to c(i,τ) yields the ﬁrst order condition
u(τ)−σi−γ(s − c(i,τ))e−ρ(τ−t) = µe−R(τ,t)p(i,τ)
13where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier. This ﬁrst order condition (and the intertemporal budget
constraint) determine the optimal consumption levels for each good at each date - given the
consumer’s lifetime income and the prices of the various goods at all dates. The above ﬁrst
order condition must hold for all i and τ,s oi tm u s ta l s oh o l df o ri = n(τ). Hence we can set
i = n(τ)i nt h ea b o v eﬁrst order condition, then take logs and the derivative with respect to


















Our analysis focuses on steady state growth paths. For describing the evolution of con-
sumption expenditures along this path, the following Lemma is helpful.
Lemma 1 In the static equilibrium the maximized instantaneous utility at date τ, ˆ u(τ), can









A balanced growth path has the following features. (i) n(τ), N(τ)a n dE(τ)g r o wa tt h e
same rate (so that output and consumption grow at the same rate and a constant fraction, if
any, of patented goods is not produced and consumed). (ii) a(τ)i sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e( s ot h a t
a constant fraction of sectors supplies their products on competitive markets).11 (iii) The price
of good xN(τ),p (xN(τ),τ), does not change over time (x ≤ 1 is a positive constant). This
means that, at all dates, the same price is attached to a given relative hierarchical position
x = i/N.12 Similarly, c(xN(τ),τ) the consumption level of the good at relative position x is
also the same at all dates τ.
Using these balanced growth properties and Lemma 1 the above ﬁrst order condition sim-
pliﬁes considerably. Lemma 1 and properties (i) - (iii) imply that, along the balanced growth
11To see the relationship between a, g, and ∆, note that, at date t + ∆ all patents granted at t and before
are expired, and all patents granted after t are not yet expired. With N(t) markets at date t, there are
N(t + ∆)=e
g∆N(t) markets at date t + ∆. Hence, at date t + ∆, the measure of competitive markets equals
N(t). Obviously, a fraction a = e
−g∆ is competitive and a fraction 1 − a =1− e
−g∆ is monopolistic.
12Note that each good i starts out with hierarchical position x =1( a si = N(τ) at the innovation date τ)a n d
gradually approaches relative position x =0( w h e nN becomes very large relative to i). As a result, the price
of a particular good is initally rising (when the product is monopolistically supplied) and then falls to marginal
costs (when patents have expired the market becomes competitive). From analogous arguments, the proﬁlo f
consumption levels can be inferred.
14path, we must have ˙ u/u = −γ ˙ E/E. Property (iii) holds for any positive constant x ≤ 1, hence
they are also true for x = n(τ)/N(τ)s ow eh a v e∂p(n(τ),τ)/∂τ = ∂c(n(τ),τ)/∂τ = 0 at all







Clearly, when E(t) grows at a constant rate, the interest rate r(t)i sa l s oc o n s t a n t . I nt h e
symmetric case (γ =0 )w eg e tt h ef a m i l i a re q u a t i o ng =( r − ρ)/σ.13
4 Long-Run Growth Equilibrium
We now describe the general equilibrium of the model. We start by deﬁning the equilibrium
growth path. Then we establish the conditions under which a unique path exists. A discussion
of the consistency of this equilibrium with the Kaldor facts of economic growth and of the
patterns of structural change along this path is devoted to the next Section.
4.1 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium Growth Path
The equilibrium growth path is characterized by the following conditions: (i) consumers allo-
cate lifetime expenditures optimally across time and goods, (ii) ﬁrms set prices that maximize
proﬁts, (iii) research ﬁrms leave no proﬁt opportunities unexploited, (iv) the labor force is
fully employed and (v) aggregate consumption and investment expenditures and the value of
aggregate production grow at the same rate.
When consumers do not purchase all available goods, n<N ,conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisﬁed when, for each date t, equations (9), (4) and (5) hold.14 Equation (9) implies that
13It is interesting to note that the eﬀect of γ on the growth rate of consumption is ambiguous (recall that
γ < 1). A higher γ raises g when σ > 1 and it decreases g if σ < 1. The intuition is subtle: With γ > 0,
the expenditures E(t) enter themselves as a concave function in the utility function. The growth rate of
consumption depends on how fast marginal utility falls. In the symmetric case marginal utility declines at rate
σ. The asymmetry has two eﬀects. On the one hand, the intertemporal substitution eﬀect causes marginal
utility to fall only at the rate σ(1 − γ); on the other side the intratemporal substitution implies that marginal
utility falls at rate γ. In total, marginal utility falls at rate σ(1−γ)+γ w h i c hi sl e s st h a nσ if σ > 1 and bigger
than σ if σ < 1.
14T h et i m ei n d e xt enters equations (4) and (5) because n depends on t.
15consumer allocate expenditure optimally across time. If equations (4) and (5) are satisﬁed
consumers allocate expenditures optimally across goods, given proﬁt maximizing prices of ﬁrms;
and ﬁrms set proﬁt-maximizing prices given the optimal quantities of consumers. Condition
(iii) is satisﬁed when the zero-proﬁt equation (8) holds, and condition (iv) is satisﬁed when the
resource constraint (7) holds. Condition (v) is satisﬁed because our speciﬁcation of preferences
boils down to a (maximized) felicity function that is CRRA in total consumption expenditures.
The model has a convenient recursive structure and we can reduce the above system of
equations to two equations in two unknowns: the economy-wide growth rate g and the inno-
vator’s waiting time δ. To obtain the ﬁrst equation substitute equation (4) into the resource
constraint (7) and use the deﬁnition g =
˙ N(t)
N(t). Moreover we make use of the fact that in the
dynamic equilibrium we have n(t)=e−δgN(t)a n daN(t)=N(t)e−∆g. The former relation
says that the relation between consumed and available goods is constant and given by e−δg.
The latter relation says that the fraction of competitive markets among all markets is constant












The second equation in g and δ is obtained by substituting equations (9), (4) and (5) into








































where we used the deﬁnition φ = r − gγ and that, from (9), r = ρ + g(σ(1 − γ)+γ).
Similarly, when consumers purchase all available goods, n = N, conditions (i) and (ii)
are satisﬁed when equations (9), (4’) and (5’) hold; and conditions (iii) and (iv) are also
given by equations (7) and (8). This system of equations can be conveniently reduced to two
equation with two unknowns: the growth rate g and the innovator’s entry price p.T h es o l u t i o n




























16for the zero-proﬁt condition.
4.2 A Unique Equilibrium
To examine existence and uniqueness of the dynamic equilibrium we analyze the respective
equilibrium conditions graphically. We denote the resource constraint by R and the zero proﬁt
condition by Π and draw R and Π in a (δ,g,p)-diagram. This allows us to discuss the above
two scenarios simultaneously (Figure 1). In both parts of Figure 1 the vertical axis measures
the growth rate g. I nt h el e f tp a r to fF i g u r e1t h eh o r i z o n t a la x i sm e a s u r e st h ei n n o v a t o r ’ s
waiting time δ (from right to left,s t a r t i n ga tδ = 0), and in the right part of Figure 1 the
horizontal axis measures the innovators’ entry price p (starting at p =1 ) .O b s e r v et h a tδ =0
and p = 1 is the limiting case where the innovator has neither a waiting time nor enough
demand to charge a price above marginal cost.
We now discuss the shape of the two curves in turn. To avoid confusion we denote the
resource constraint in (g,δ)-space by ˜ R and the one in (g,p)-space by R. Similarly, we have
Π and ˜ Π for the zero-proﬁt condition. The R-curve in (g,δ) space is deﬁned by the equation
1= ˜ R(g,δ)a n d ˜ R(g,δ) is given by the right-hand-side of equation (10). The Π-curve is deﬁned
by the equation wF = ˜ Π(g,δ)w h e r e˜ Π(g,δ) is given by the right-hand-side of equation (11).
Similarly, the R-a n dt h eΠ-curve in (g,p)s p a c ea r ed e ﬁned by 1 = R(g,p)a n dwF = Π(g,p)
where R(g,p)a n dΠ(g,p) by given by the right-hand-side of equations (10’) and (11’).
Figure1
The shape of the Π-curve Consider ﬁrst the (g,δ) space. When the consumer does not
buy all available goods, n<N ,innovators have a waiting time δ > 0 until they can sell their
product. The slope of the ˜ Π-curve is given by dg/dδ = −˜ Πδ/˜ Πg. Ah i g h e rδ decreases proﬁts
so ˜ Πδ < 0( w h e r e˜ Πx denotes the partial derivative of ˜ Π with respect to x). This simply results
from discounting: the longer one has to wait for a given proﬁt ﬂow, the lower is the present
value of this ﬂow. This eﬀect is enhanced by the fact that, due to a ﬁxed patent duration ∆,
the period during which the innovator earns positive proﬁts does not only start later but also
becomes shorter (recall that we measure δ from left to right).
The impact of the growth rate g on the value of an innovation Π,i . e . t h es i g no f˜ Πg is
ambiguous. In a world with homothetic preferences where all goods enter the utility function
17in a symmetric way, a higher growth rate always lowers the value of an innovation. This
is because in equilibrium, a higher growth rate is always associated with a higher interest
rate that discounts future revenues more strongly (see the discussion in Romer, 1990). With
hierarchic preferences instead, we have a second eﬀect: a higher growth rate raises demand for
the most recent innovator’s product and leads to faster growth of the innovator’s market. This
leads to higher future prices and higher future proﬁts which raises the value of an innovation.
T h es i z eo ft h el a t t e re ﬀect depends crucially on the value of γ, the steepness of the hierarchy:
Lemma 2 below shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates if γ is low. Instead, if the hierarchy
parameter γ is large, the demand eﬀect of higher growth dominates the interest rate eﬀect at
low level of g (see Figure 1). It is important to note that a steep hierarchy is a necessary
condition for the regime n<Nto be possible at all. When innovators have no initial demand,
there are innovation incentives only if, after the waiting period δ, demand grows very quickly.
When consumers purchase all available products, n = N, innovators have no waiting time
δ = 0 and charge an entry price larger than marginal cost p ≥ 1. The slope of the Π-curve is
given by dg/dp = −Πp/Πg. How does the value of an innovation depend on p?W ek n o wf r o m
(5’) that a higher entry price p for the most recent innovator’s product means higher prices for
all other goods in equilibrium. Moreover, from equation (4’) a higher p is also associated with
larger equilibrium consumption of each variety. Hence each monopolist has larger proﬁts, so
we have Πp > 0.
T h ei m p a c to ft h eg r o w t hr a t eg on the value of an innovation is just like before. The
demand eﬀect increases, whereas the interest eﬀect decreases the value of an innovation. The
demand eﬀect can dominate at low growth rates when the hierarchy is steep enough, whereas
the interest eﬀect dominates at high growth rates.









b. The value of an innovation falls monotonically in the growth rate if γ ≤
σ(pZ−1)
1+σ(pZ−1) (ﬂat
hierarchy). In this case, the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n ti sam o n o t o n i c a l l yi n c r e a s i n gc u r v ei nt h e
(g,p)-space.
c. For g suﬃciently high, Πg < 0 and ˜ Πg < 0.
Proof see Appendix.
18The shape of the R-curve The slope of the resource constraint R can be derived in an
analogous way as before by calculating, respectively, dg/dδ = − ˜ Rδ/ ˜ Rg and dg/dp = −Rp/Rg
for the two regimes. A higher waiting time δ reduces labor demand. The reason is that a higher
δ decreases the demand for each product. (To see this use n = e−δgN in equation (4)). This
means that ˜ Rδ < 0. Similarly, a higher entry price p is associated with higher consumption
levels for all goods (see equation (4’)), and thus with a larger demand for labor in the whole
economy. For this reason Rp > 0.
Ah i g h e rg r o w t hr a t eg has an ambiguous eﬀect on the demand for labor resources. On the
one hand, there is the direct eﬀect from a larger demand for workers in the research sector.
On the other hand, there is an indirect eﬀect which is due to the increase in the size of the
monopolistic sector. (Recall from Section 4 above that, with a given patent duration ∆, a
fraction e−g∆ of all goods is supplied by competitive producers and a fraction 1 − e−g∆ by
monopolistic ﬁrms). The larger the monopolistic sector, the higher the overall price level, and
the lower consumption demand. Hence an increase in g leads to a lower demand for production
workers. The following Lemma shows that the latter eﬀect may dominate at low g,w h e r e a s
the former eﬀect always dominates at high g. We therefore have Rg > 0i fg is high and vice
versa. We summarize this discussion in the following








if 1 <b s≤
1+γ
γ .
b. If bs ≤ 1, the resource constraint is monotonically falling in the (g,p)-a n d(δ,g)-space





c. If bs >
1+γ
γ , even at g =0not all products can be produced, the share of products
consumed x = n
N is then given by the equation 1=bs
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d. For g suﬃciently high, Rg > 0 and ˜ Rg > 0.
Proof see Appendix.
Remark If bs ≤ 1, the R−curve never hits the p−axis. All consumers could consume all
varieties at the saturation level and there are still resources available for research.
Having discussed the shape of the two curves we can consider the general equilibrium of the
model. In this equilibrium both the resource constraint and the zero proﬁt condition have to
be satisﬁed which is the case at the point of intersection E in Figure 1.15 As u ﬃcient condition
15Figure 1 suggests that the equilibrium exists if the Π-curve hits the p-axis to the left of R-curve. For most
19for uniqueness is γ ≤
σ(pZ−1)
1+σ(pZ−1) (ﬂat hierarchy) and bs ≤ 1, since then the two equilibrium
curves are monotonically increasing or falling, respectively.
Proposition 1 a. If the exogenous parameters satisfy pZ <p R or if bs ≤ 1,t h e r ee x i s t sa
general equilibrium with a positive growth rate.
b. A suﬃcient condition for a unique general equilibrium is bs ≤ 1 and γ ≤
σ(pZ−1)
1+σ(pZ−1).
Proof Part b. see Appendix.
5 Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts
In this Section we discuss of how the famous stylized facts mentioned by Kaldor (1961) can
be reconciled with a continuous change in the structure of production and employment. We
proceed in four steps. First, as the Kaldor facts of economic growth are partly concerned with
physical capital, we have to show that the equilibrium established in the last Section - when
enriched with physical capital - meets Kaldor’s criteria. Second, we describe the patterns of
structural change that occur along the long-run growth path, in particular the rise and fall
of the employment shares in the various sectors that occurs during the process of economic
development. Then, we study the critical role of the two taste parameters that characterize
the hierarchy of needs, the saturation level s and the steepness of the hierarchy γ. Finally, we
perform a simple quantitative exercise where we confront our model with data on structural
change in several industrialized countries.
5.1 The Kaldor Facts
In a celebrated paper, Kaldor (1961) mentions that a reasonable growth model should capture
the following criteria: (i) a constant growth rate of output and labor productivity; (ii) a
constant increase in capital per worker; (iii) a constant long-term interest rate; (iv) a constant
capital-output ratio; (v) a constant share of proﬁts in output; and (vi) diﬀerences in growth
rate of labor productivity across countries.
The long-run growth equilibrium established above assumes that labor is the only pro-
duction factor. In order to discuss Kaldor’s stylized facts in a meaningful way, we have to
parameter values, simulations show that the equilibrium is unique.
20bring physical capital into the picture. Assume that each consumer good is produced with the
same constant-returns-to-scale technology F[k(i,t),A(t)l(i,t)] and that also capital goods are
produced with that technology. k(i,t)a n dl(i,t) denote, respectively, the amounts of physi-
cal capital and labor employed in sector i at date t.16 A(t) is the stock of (labor-augmenting)
technical knowledge and it is again assumed that A(t)=N(t). Given the linear homogeneity of
the production function we can write f(κ(i,t)) = F[
k(i,t)
A(t)l(i,t),1] with κ(i,t) as the capital-labor
ratio in eﬃciency units of labor and f(κ(i,t)) as the production function in intensive form.
When ﬁnancial markets are perfect, savings yield the same returns, irrespective of whether
they are invested in physical capital or in research. With a competitive market for capital
goods, the rental price of capital equals r(t)+δ,w h e r eδ is the rate of depreciation of physical
capital. The rental price is the same in each sector. Each ﬁr mh a st op a yaw a g er a t ew
and a rental price of physical capital r + δ. Cost minimization implies that each ﬁrm chooses
the same capital-labor ratio. This implies that marginal production costs are the same in all
sectors. In a steady state, where the interest rate is constant, the capital labor ratio is constant
over time. For ﬁrms that operate under competitive conditions we must have f0(κ(i,t)) = r.
Because all ﬁrms choose the same capital labor ration we have, for all i and t, κ(i,t)=κ.
When κ is constant, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor is also constant. Obviously, the
wage rate per worker grows at the same rate as productivity.
The ﬁnal step is to show that the capital output ratio is constant. To see this, suppose that
employment in investment sector is constant. First, since κ is constant, output of investment
goods I grows at the same rate as productivity. Physical capital evolves according to ˙ K =
I − δK, thus the capital stock grows also at the same rate as productivity. Second, output in
the research sector is given by w(t)gF w h i c ha l s og r o w sa tt h es a m er a t ea sp r o d u c t i v i t y .T h i r d ,
the value of output in the consumption sector also grows at the same rate. This is because, with
marginal costs constant over time, the price setting behavior is the same as before. Hence the
proﬁt share in the consumption goods sector is constant and the Euler equation (9) still holds.
In the steady state, the optimal growth rate of consumption expenditures equals the growth
rate of productivity. Hence when wages grow at this rate, employment in the consumption
goods sector is constant. This conﬁrms our initial guess that employment in the investment
16Since technology is linear homogenous, the distribution of capital on the several ﬁrms in sector i plays no
role.
21sector is constant. Output equals Y (t)=E(t)+I(t)+w(t)gF and therefore grows at the same
rate as productivity. Hence the capital-output ratio is constant. We summarize this discussion
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Along the steady growth path the Kaldor facts of economic growth are satisﬁed.
5.2 Structural Change
The equilibrium growth path exhibits continuous structural change: At a given date, many
diﬀerent goods exist and each good has a diﬀerent income elasticity. Declining sectors with
a low income elasticity and a falling share of production and employment co-exist with ex-
panding sectors that have a high income elasticity and expanding share of production and
employment. Hence there is uneven development and continuous reallocation of labor across
sectors of production. In this Section we describe the pattern of structural change in more
detail. We will concentrate on the regime n<Nand brieﬂy discuss the regime n = N at the
end of the section.
To make the changes in the structure of consumption and employment explicit consider
the life cycle of product i. How does demand and employment of an innovator increase over
time? To answer this question take equation (4) and note that along the long-run growth path
we have n(t)=e−δgN(t). Given the initial value of N, the growth rate g, and the innovator’s
waiting time δ, we know the equilibrium value of n(t). From equation (4) the consumption
level c(i,t) and the corresponding level of employment l(i,t)=b
c(i,t)
N(t) can be calculated.
Figure 2 shows the Engel-curves for good i = N(t). We draw c(i,t) against total output
in the production sector E(t). As E(t),N (t), and n(t)g r o wa tt h es a m er a t et h es h a p eo f
the Engel-curve can be derived from (4). Demand is initially zero and the non-negativity
constraints are still binding. This means at low income levels consumers cannot aﬀord the
product. Once a critical income level has been reached consumers start to buy. Increases in
income initially lead to a strong expansion of the market, followed by decreasing growth rates
and ﬁnally stagnating demand in the long term once consumption approaches the saturation
level s. We note further that Engel-curves show a discontinuity at the point of time when
patents expire. At this date the market opens up for competition, the price falls to marginal
22cost, and the demand level jumps up.
Figure2
The following proposition summarizes the patterns of structural change by referring to the
income elasticities of demand and employment. The ’gross’ income elasticities take account of
both the direct income eﬀect on demand and of the indirect eﬀects due to changes in the own
price and the prices of all other (monopolistically supplied) products as incomes grow.
Proposition 3 a) Along the steady growth path, each new good starts out as a luxury with
high income elasticity and ends up as a necessity with low income elasticity. The ’gross’ income
elasticity of demand for good i is γ
s−c(i,t)
c(i,t) . b) Industries producing luxuries (with gross income
elasticity larger than unity) expand their employment whereas industries producing necessities
(with gross income elasticity lower than unity) loose employment. The ’gross’ income elasticity
for employment is γ
s−c(i,t)
c(i,t) − 1.
This proposition holds for both regimes. As E(t), N(t)a n dn(t)g r o wa tt h es a m er a t e ,w e








c(i,t). For both regimes, the expressions
in the proposition can be derived, respectively, from equations (4) and (4’). Part b) of the











Part a) of the proposition shows that, for a given product, the demand elasticity is initially
high and decreases towards zero as consumption approaches the saturation level s.17 In other
words, despite constant growth rates of macroeconomic aggregates, goods with high and low
income elasticities coexist and continuous structural change takes place. This means our model
captures the Engel-Kindleberger idea of consumption cycles. Whether or not a good is a luxury
or a necessity, depends on the level of development. Income elasticities change as the economy
gets richer, and a good that has been a luxury good in the initial period of the product cycle
becomes a necessity after incomes have suﬃciently grown.
Part b) of the proposition discusses the evolution of the employment share in a particular
product line. Whether or not employment increases or decreases, depends on whether demand
17Also with respect to demand elasticities note the discontinuity at the date when patents expire. At this
date the demand level jumps up and thus there is a sudden decrease in the income elasticity.
23grows faster or slower than productivity. In other words, the industry-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n t
level reﬂects the outcome of a race between the growth of demand and productivity as the
economy gets richer. Initially the growth of demand is larger than the aggregate growth rate
and employment increases over time. However, after incomes have suﬃciently grown, the
growth of market demand lags behind the aggregate growth rate and the industry labor share
decreases.
6O t h e r E q u i l i b r i a
If the parameter values satisfy pZ ≥ pR a stagnation equilibrium or multiple equilibria may
a r i s e( s e eL e m m a s2a n d3f o rt h ed e ﬁnitions of pZ and pR). In that case, the Π-curve cuts
the p-axis to the right of the R-curve.
Stagnation In a stagnation equilibrium the value of an innovation is (equal or) smaller
than the costs of an innovation, which implies that no research will be undertaken. Not
surprisingly, this outcome is likely if research costs F are high. Also in the stagnatory state,
the full employment condition has to be satisﬁed, hence the equilibrium point lies on the R-
curve and is located where the R-curve intersects the horizontal axis (at g =0 ) .I fn = N,t h e
R-curve hits the horizontal axis in the right part of Figure 1. This occurs at pR > 1. When
this inequality is violated the regime n = N is not feasible and we are in the regime n<N .
As the economy does not grow, the waiting time δ is not a meaningful endogenous variable
because δ will necessarily be inﬁnite. As stated in Lemma 3c, the resource constraint has to
be solved for x = n/N, the share of available products that is actually consumed. In such an
equilibrium there are ﬁrms that know how to produce the goods i ∈ (n,N], but no production
ever takes place since demand given the (constant) income level is too small.
Multiple equilibria If pZ ≥ pR and if the two curves cross the model exhibits multiple equi-
libria. We then have three equilibria: the stagnation point and the two points of intersection
of the Π-a n dt h eR-curve.
Figure3
Multiple equilibria can arise because the Π-curve is not necessarily monotonic. When the
hierarchy is steep enough (high γ)t h eΠ-curve is backward bending at low levels of g, see
24Lemma 2b. The intercept of the resource constraint with the horizontal axis, pR, shifts to
t h el e f tw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nγ. According to Proposition 1, this implies that multiple equilibria
become more likely.
The reason for multiplicity is a demand externality: when preferences have a hierarchic
structure the demand of a previous innovator depends on the economy-wide growth rate. If
innovators expect high growth they expect that the demand for their products expands more
quickly implying that future prices, quantities, and proﬁts are larger. So higher economy-
wide growth stimulates the incentive to innovate. If innovators expect low growth, proﬁt
expectations and the resulting incentives to innovate are correspondingly low. Hence low
growth rates are sustained by pessimistic expectations and vice versa. Obviously, this demand
externality is at work independently of the particular length of a patent; in particular it holds
even when protection is forever.18 We summarize this discussion in the following
Proposition 4 As u ﬃciently steep hierarchy (γ suﬃciently large) may lead to multiple equi-
libria. In such equilibria expectations are self-fulﬁlling: optimistic expectations are sustained
with high innovative activities, pessimistic expectations are sustained by low (or no) innovative
activities.
We prove proposition 4 by an example. Assume the following parameter values: F =8 ,
L =1 , ∆ = ∞,bs=1 0 /3, σ =2 , ρ =0 .02, γ =0 .95 (note that the hierarchy parameter γ is
very close to unity). In that case, there are three equilibria: (p1,g 1)=( 1 .135,0), (p2,g 2)=
(1.080,0.79%), and (δ3,g 3)=( 8 .79,7.03%). Hence, two equilibria exhibit a positive growth
rate and one is stagnatory. Further, for these parameter values, the high growth equilibrium
features a waiting time δ3 =8 .79 years for the innovators.
7 A Simple Quantitative Illustration
While the main purpose of our model is theoretical, it may nevertheless be interesting to look
at its quantitative implications. In this section we provide such a simple quantitative exercise.
Maddison (1987) documents the huge reallocation of labor in six major industrialized countries
18As shown by Laussel and Nyssen (1999) who multiple equilibria may also arise due to a ﬁnite patent length.
However in the present model the possibility of multiplicity does not hinge on the length of patents. Provided
that γ is suﬃciently large, mulitple equilibria may occur even if patent length is inﬁinte.
25(France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, U.K. and U.S.). Table 1 shows that the average U.S.
employment share in agriculture was as high as 46 % in 1870 and has decreased to 5.5 % by
1984. During the same period the average employment share in the service sector has increased
from 26.4 % to 62.2 %.
Table1
Although, the common three sector division is questionable as the structural composition has
changed dramatically also within these sectors we may think of a loose association with the
sectoral trichotomy in our model: Products satisfying the most urgent needs (mostly, but not
entirely, agricultural products) are ranked ﬁrst and products satisfying least urgent wants (to
a large extent, but not entirely, service products) are ranked highest. To make the quantitative
exercise as simple as possible, we assume that goods i between 0 and 1 are agricultural products,
goods between 1 and x are manufacturing products, and goods with higher index are exclusively
services. The labor used to set-up a new ﬁrms (R&D labor) is counted as services.19
Can our model explain the observed patterns of structural change documented in Table 1?
As starting point we choose N(0) such that the labor share in agriculture amounts to 50%,
manufacturing to 30%, and services to 20%. The exogenous parameters are set to F =8 ,
L =1 , ∆ = ∞,bs=1 0 /3, σ =2 , ρ =0 .02, γ =0 .77 and x =4 . This yields an equilibrium
growth rate of g =2 .2% and a price level for the most luxurious good of p =1 .06.
Figure4
The simulations are presented in Figure 4. We see that the model is able to reproduce the
observed patterns of structural change remarkably well. Agriculture exhibits a steady decline
from 50 percent to about 5 percent after 120 years. Services stay constant at early stages (as
long as N(t) <x= 4) but exhibit a steady increase thereafter and reach a level of roughly 80
percent after 120 years. Our model also generates a hump shape in the manufacturing labor
19By this assumption we capture the empirical fact that, even in a less developed society, a large fraction of
the population works in the service sector, such as retail trade, housing services, etc. A precise way to capture
ap o s i t i v es e r v i c el a b o rs h a r ei nt h em o d e lw o u l db et r e a t i n gs e r v i c e sa sa ni n p u ti np r o d u c t i o no fﬁnal output.
In the present context we assume that services enter as an input only via set-up costs: This should be viewed
as a shortcut necessary to capture the empirical facts.
26share. Starting with 30 percent, the manufacturing labor share reaches 47 percent around 35
years and decreases thereafter reaching roughly 15 percent after 120 years.
Contrasting this simulation with the country average in Table 1 (last column) reveals that
the model predicts the huge movement of labor out of agriculture remarkably well. The model
also predicts a hump shape in the evolution of the manufacturing share that is observed in all
countries displayed in Figure 4 (with the exception of Japan). We also see that (i) the increase
in the manufacturing labor share is initially too strong; (ii) the peak is reached too early; and
(iii) the decrease in manufacturing employment is too strong. It should be clear, however,
that this result is due to the extreme assumption on the mapping of the consumption hier-
archy into the sectoral trichotomy. Assume, more realistically, that ”intermediate” needs are
covered mostly by manufacturing products but to some extent also by services; and that the
most luxurious wants are covered mostly by services but to some extent also by manufacturing
products.20 Then the transition to a service economy would be smoother. In early stages of
economic development, workers leaving the agricultural sector would not only enter the manu-
facturing sector but also the service sector. In later stages, workers leaving old manufacturing
industries would not only enter the service sector but also new manufacturing industries. In
sum, relaxing the above extreme mapping assumption, would lead to (i) a smaller increase in
the manufacturing labor share, (ii) a delay in the date when the manufacturing labor share
peaks, and (iii) a smaller decrease in the manufacturing labor share thereafter. Hence we
conclude our model is capable of ﬁtting the empirical patterns of structural change quite well.
Needless to say, while our model can capture important features of the process of structural
change it does not ﬁt these patterns perfectly. A full story has to account for technological
heterogeneity across sectors.
8 Discussion
Our analysis has made a number of strong assumptions. We have based our analysis on
the concept of hierarchic preferences and have speciﬁed these preferences in a particular way.
Moreover we have abstracted from technological asymmetries across sectors and have assumed
20More precisely, assume that with probability θ(i) a new product is a manufacturing good and with prob-
ability 1 − θ(i) a new product is a service, with θ
0(i) ≤ 0. Our simulation makes the extreme assumption that
θ(i)=1f o ri ∈ (1,4] and θ(i)=0f o ri>4.
27that all sectors participate equally from technical progress. In this section we discuss the
robustness of our results with respect to deviations from these assumptions.
Assumptions on preferences To generate a balanced growth path we have assumed (i)
a felicity function that is additively separable across the various products, (ii) a quadratic
subutility function, and (iii) a consumption hierarchy that weights the products with a power
function. The assumption of additive separability is primarily made for tractability.21
The functional form of the subutility function v(c) is not essential. As shown by Foellmi
(2003) any form of v(·)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the usual assumptions v0(c) > 0a n dv00(c) < 0w o u l d
do. We only need a small set of regularity conditions: To guarantee that the utility integral
is well deﬁn e dw eh a v et on o r m a l i z ev(0) = 0; and to allow for an equilibrium with binding
non-negativity constraints we must have v0(0) < ∞ (which also implies that utility is non-
homothetic). The quadratic form of v(·) has been chosen to obtain closed-form solutions.
Moreover, its saturation point captures a basic idea of any model of hierarchic consumption
in a very stylized way: Consumers move to goods with less priority, once they have saturated
their basic needs.22
The restriction of the weighting function to take the power form i−γ is essential. It implies
that demand functions (and monopoly prices) only depend on the relative (rather than the
absolute) position of the product in the hierarchy. As a result, the maximized static utility
function can be expressed as a function of total (current) expenditure levels, the function taking
the constant elasticity form with parameter γ. In other words, in intertemporal problems with
a continuum of goods, assuming additive separability and weighting by a power function is the
equivalent of assuming a CRRA-felicity function in the one-good growth model.23 In either
case, these functional forms guarantee a constant rate of consumption growth when rates of
21The assumption of separability implies that ”Pigou’s law”, proportionality of income and price elasticities,
holds in our model. Clements and Selvanathan (1994), in an empirical study based on aggregate cross-country
consumption data, ﬁnd empirical evidence in favor of Pigou’s law.
22For instance, it is not necessary to have a utility function with a saturation level. In an earlier version of
this paper (Foellmi and Zweim¨ uller, 2003) we have used the felicity function v(c)=l n ( c+q)w i t hq as a positive
constant. This yields qualitatively similar results (and explicit solutions) except that the demand elastity for a
given product remains strictly positive.




is CRRA in expenditure levels if the price of good i can be expressed as a function of its relative position i/N
only. This clearly holds true in the present model.
28interest and time preference are constant over time.
Sectoral diﬀerences in productivity levels and productivity growth The second
important assumption relied on identical supply conditions across sectors. We have motivated
this assumption by various arguments - including lack of a strong empirical case for sectoral
diﬀerences in productivity growth rates. Nevertheless, it can be shown that sectoral diﬀerences
in productivity levels and/or scopes for productivity growth can be integrated in our model.
The case is straightforward when only productivity levels (but not rates of technical progress)
diﬀer across sectors. Consider the simplest case, when labor is the only production factor, and
the labor coeﬃcient in product line i is given by a(i)=a + ε(i)w i t hε(i) being the deviation
of sector i from average productivity. Assume that the distribution of ε has the properties
Eε(i)=0 ,Eε(i)2 = σ2, and Eε(i)ε(i + ∆)=0f o r∆ 6= i. The latter assumption implies
that there are no systematic diﬀerences in productivity level between high- and low-priority
goods. Absent such diﬀerences, there is no mechanism that would lead to violation of the
Kaldor facts. Note however, that patterns of structural change may be aﬀected. Allowing
for random diﬀerences in technology across sectors may reverse the order in which new goods
and services are introduced. When a(i) À a(j) so that productivity in sector i is much lower
than in j, then good j may be introduced earlier even if i has higher priority, so that i<j .
To compensate for the higher costs, the innovator has to charge higher prices. To generate
t h es a m ep r o ﬁt ﬂow, high-cost products have to be introduced later (when monopoly prices
are higher or the waiting time is shorter), whereas low-cost earlier than in the basic case of
equal costs. Obviously, very similar arguments can be made when there are two factors of
production, and when production functions diﬀer ”randomly” across product lines.
The situation becomes slightly more tricky when there are sectoral diﬀerences in technical
progress. Assume, there is uncertainty with respect to technical progress at the date when a
new product is introduced. Each good starts out with the ”state-of-the-art” technology. With
probability β a new sector is ”dynamic” (costs fall with the number of previous innovations
N(t), just like before) and ”stagnant” with probability 1−β (no change in costs of production).
This implies that, at each date, there co-exist dynamic sectors with ”state-of-the-art” produc-
tivity levels b/N(t) and stagnant sectors with b/N(s)w h e r es denotes the period when the
product is introduced. (The latter assumption says that all new sectors start out with state-
29of-the-art productivity but only dynamic sectors experience productivity growth). Assume
that β is uncorrelated with the priority of a product, so sectoral diﬀerences are ”random” in
the sense that low- and high-priority goods have the same scope for technical progress. Prod-
ucts that experience technical progress will experience unchanged marginal costs and rising
prices. Products that experience no technical progress will suﬀer from the ”cost disease”. Un-
like in the Baumol model, stagnant products will disappear from the market because sooner
or later costs will become larger than the prohibitive price. The steady-state growth path is
characterized by a constant fraction of output and employment in stagnant sectors, though the
composition of these sectors changes over time as new goods enter and old goods disappear.
Hence, our framework can capture, by way of a natural extension, also the fact that goods and
services disappear over time.
A further dimension of technological heterogeneity across sectors involves the scope for
technological spillovers. Suppose there are diﬀerences across sectors in the contribution of
innovation i to the aggregate stock of knowledge. With a probability α, the by-product of a
new innovation is additional knowledge that makes factors more productive in all other sectors,
a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1− α, there are no such knowledge spillovers. As a result, the aggregate
stock of knowledge is given by A(t)=αN(t). In other words, productivity levels are only α
times as high as in the basic model, the equilibrium outcome of our model remains otherwise
unchanged.
A ﬁnal point concerns diﬀerences in technologies between investment and consumption
goods. The analysis above has shown that the consumption sector can be aggregated nicely,
the model could be extended to a two sector framework ` a la Rebelo (1991). It is well known
that a balanced growth path exists within that model even though consumption and investment
goods are produced with diﬀerent technologies and experience diﬀerent rates of productivity
growth. Such a framework would account for the empirical evidence in Greenwood et al.
(1997).
The above discussion has highlighted conditions on technological asymmetries that are
compatible with the Kaldor facts. We have seen that the absence of a correlation between
the relevant technology parameters and the hierarchy index i is essential. It is straightforward
to see how the long-run growth path is aﬀected when these conditions are violated. If there
are systematic correlations over extended intervals along the consumption hierarchy growth
30rates will no longer be constant. Hence our framework can generate growth cycles, periods of
productivity slowdowns and productivity revivals.
9 Conclusions and Extensions
We have presented a model that reconciles two dominant features of the long-run growth
process: the dramatic changes in the structure of production and employment; and the Kaldor
facts of economic growth. Our model has focused on the demand-explanation of structural
change which is based on the idea that households expand their consumption along a hierarchy
of needs. In such a context structural change results from diﬀerences in income elasticities
across sectors. We have proposed a speciﬁcation of hierarchic preferences featuring realistic
patterns of structural change while at the same time generating an equilibrium growth path
consistent with the Kaldor facts.
Our analysis has focused on an endogenous growth framework. Studying hierarchic prefer-
ences in an R&D driven endogenous growth model highlight interesting interactions between
structural change and long-run growth. On the one hand, the aggregate growth rate depends
on structural change because innovation incentives are crucially determined by the growth rates
in the new industries. On the other hand, the speed of structural change is itself determined
by aggregate growth. The resulting complementarities between sectoral and aggregate growth
open up the possibility for multiple equilibria. Hence our model is not only capable of yielding
insights into the process of growth and structural change, but sheds also light on the question
why some countries experience high long-term growth and many industries take oﬀ,w h i l ei n
other countries we see neither a change in the production structure nor increases in aggregate
productivity.
Finally, we have also shown by means of a simple quantitative illustration, that our model
is able to capture realistic patterns of structural change. In particular, our simulation show
that the model is capable of reproducing the great structural transformation from agriculture
towards industry and services. We also show that the model predicts, consistent with observed
patterns of change, that the manufacturing employment ﬁrst increases and then decreases in
the course of economic development.
Our model can be extended in several directions. We think that two extensions are most
promising. First, while our analysis has focused on a representative consumer, the introduction
31of consumer heterogeneity is potentially interesting. As preferences are non-homothetic, rich
and poor households will consume diﬀerent consumption bundles which opens up a new channel
by which income inequality could aﬀect growth and structural change (Foellmi and Zweim¨ uller,
2005). Second, hierarchic preferences in a world economy with rich and poor countries would
imply interesting patterns of growth and the international division of labor. Our model provides
a natural way of modelling the Linder-hypothesis (Linder, 1961) and/or the product-cycle
hypothesis (Vernon, 1966). A rich country faces high home-demand and hence will innovate
early. The poor country will ﬁrst import new goods, but later on start to imitate. Hence
rich countries will produce new goods with a high income elasticity and poor countries will
produce old goods with a low elasticity. Our set-up may also be useful to understand the
mixed empirical evidence concerning the Prebisch/Singer-hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950, Singer,
1950) according to which the terms of trade for the poor countries deteriorate as their exports
are concentrated on goods with low income elasticities. (For a static model along these lines,
see Matsuyama, 2000).
32References
Acemoglu, Daron and Veronica Guerrieri (2005); Capital Deepening and Non-Balanced
Economic Growth, mimeo, MIT.
Baumol, William J. (1967); Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of the
Urban Crisis, The American Economic Review 57: 415-426.
Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur John Coleman II (2001); The U.S. Structural Transformation
and Regional Convergence: A Reinterpretation, Journal of Political Economy 109: 584-616.
Chari, V.V. and Hugo Hopenhayn (1991); Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Dif-
fusion of New Technology, Journal of Political Economy 99: 1142-1165.
Clements, Kenneth W. and Saroja Selvanathan (1994); Understanding Consumption Pat-
terns, Empirical Economics 10: 69-110.
Echevarria, Cristina (1997); Changes in Sectoral Composition Associated with Economic
Growth, International Economic Review 38: 431-452.
Engel, Ernst (1857); Die Productions- und Consumptionsverh¨ altnisse des K¨ onigreichs Sach-
sen, Zeitschrift des Statistischen B¨ ureaus des K¨ oniglich S¨ achsischen Ministeriums des Inneren,
No. 8 und 9.
Foellmi, Reto (2003); Consumption Structure and Macroeconomics, Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Zurich.
Foellmi, Reto and Josef Zweim¨ uller (2003); Structural Change and Balanced Growth with
a Hierarchy of Needs, mimeo, University of Zurich.
Foellmi, Reto and Josef Zweim¨ uller (2005); Income Distribution and Demand-Induced In-
novations, CEPR Working Paper No. 4985.
Gollin, Douglas, Stephen Parente, and Richard Rogerson (2002); The Role of Agriculture
in Development, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 92: 160-164.
Gollin, Douglas, Stephen Parente, and Richard Rogerson (2004); The Food Problem and
the Evolution of International Income Levels, Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper
No. 899.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell (1997); Long-Run Implications of
Investment-Speciﬁc Structural Change, American Economic Review 87: 342-362.
Greenwood, Jeremy and Gokce Uysal (2005); New Goods and the Transition to a New
Economy, Journal of Economic Growth, 10, 99-134.
33Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1992); Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Hansen, Gary D. and Edward C. Prescott (2002); Malthus to Solow, American Economic
Review 92: 1205-17.
Houthakker, Hendrick S. (1987); Engel Curve, in: J.Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman
(eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan, pp. 142-143.
Jones Charles I. (1999); Growth with or without Scale Eﬀects, American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings 89: 139-144.
Kaldor, Nicholas (1961); Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth, in: F. Lutz and
D.C. Hague (eds.), The Theory of Capital, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp.177-222.
Katona, George (1964); The Mass Consumption Society, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kindleberger, Charles (1989); Economic Laws and Economic History, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kongsamut, Piyabha, Sergio Rebelo, and Danyang Xie (2001); Beyond Balanced Growth,
Review of Economic Studies 68: 869-882.
Laitner, John (2000); Structural Change and Economic Growth, Review of Economic Stud-
ies 67: 545-561.
Laussel, Didier and Jules Nyssen (1999); Endogenous Growth and Multiplicity due to Finite
Patents’ Lifetime, Economics Letters 63: 167-173.
Linder, Staﬀan B. (1961); An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Stockholm, Almqvist
& Wicksell.
Maddison, Angus (1987); Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies: Tech-
niques of Quantitative Assessment, Journal of Economic Literature 25: 649-698.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (1992); Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Eco-
nomic Growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58: 317-334.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (2000); A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under Non-
homothetic Preferences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distribution, and North-South
Trade, Journal of Political Economy 108: 1093-1120.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (2002); The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies, Journal of Political
Economy 110: 1035-1070.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (2005), Structural Change, forthcoming in: New Palgrave Dictionary
34of Economics, London, Macmillan.
Ngai, Rachel and Christopher Pissarides (2005); Structural Change in a Multi-Sector Model
o fG r o w t h ,m i m e o ,L S E .
Parente, Stephen L. and Edward C. Prescott (2004); A Uniﬁed Theory of the Evolution of
International Income Diﬀerences, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department
Staﬀ Report 333.
Pasinetti, Luigi (1981); Structural Change and Economic Growth, CUP, Cambridge MA,
London.
Prebisch, Raul (1950); The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal
Problems, New York: UN.
Rebelo, Sergio (1991); Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 99: 500-521.
Romer, Paul (1990); Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy 98:
S71-S102.
Singer, Hans W. (1950); The Distribution of Gains Between Borrowing and Investing Coun-
tries, American Economic Review 40: 473-485.
Thompson, Peter (2001); The Microeconomics of an R&D-Based Model of Endogenous
Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 6: 263-283.
Vernon, Raymond S. (1966); International Investment and International Trade in the Prod-
uct Cycle, Quarterly Journal of Economics 80: 190-207.
Young, Alwin (1993a); Substitution and Complementarity in Endogenous Innovation, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 108: 775-807.
Young, Alwin (1993b); Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing, Journal of Political
Economy 101: 443-472.
Zweim¨ uller, Josef (2000); Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel’s Law: The Impact of
Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 5: 185-206.
35Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider ﬁrst the regime n<N .To get the maximized utility ˆ u for a given level
of expenditures E and a given menu of goods N, we insert equilibrium quantities (4) into the utility
























which we can write as ˆ u = n1−γ
1−γ ψ( n
N,a;γ,s). We know from (6), that we can write E = snφ( n
N,a;γ,s)
which implies n = E
sφ( n



































which can be written as ˆ u = N1−γ
1−γ Ψ(p,a;γ,s). We know from equation (6’) that we can write E =
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(τ − t)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ ≤ 0
⇐⇒ Θ(p,0) = −σ(1 − γ)(2p − 1) − (σ(1 − γ)+2 γ)
1
2p − 1







⇐⇒ 2p − 1 ≥
σ(1 − γ)+2 γ
σ(1 − γ)
.





≤ 0, the zero proﬁt constraint has a positive slope, i.e. we must
have p0(g) ≥ 0. Together with the lower bounds of p above we can determine the sign of the partial
derivatives of Θ(p,g)
Θp = −2σ(1 − γ)+
2
(2p − 1)
2 (σ(1 − γ)+2 γ)e−2gγ(τ−t)
≤− 2σ(1 − γ)+
2σ2(1 − γ)2
(σ(1 − γ)+2 γ)
2e−2gγ(τ−t) < 0
Θg = −2(σ(1 − γ)+γ)γ (τ − t)e−gγ(τ−t) +2( σ(1 − γ)+2 γ)γ (τ − t)e−2gγ(τ−t) 1
2p − 1
≤− 2(σ(1 − γ)+γ)γ (τ − t)e−gγ(τ−t) +2 σ(1 − γ)γ (τ − t)e−2gγ(τ−t) < 0
Hence Θ(p(g),g) < Θ(p(0),g) < Θ(p(0),0) ≤ 0 which completes the proof.
37b. Insert g =0i n t ot h ez e r op r o ﬁt condition (11’) (since demand does not grow when g =0 ,a n


















1 − e−ρ∆ =
µp










1 − e−ρ∆ =
p




Note that only the positive root is relevant since 2pz − 1 > 1. We denote
√
2pz − 1=x,t h ee q u a t i o n



































Θ(1,g)(τ − t)e−r(τ−t)dτ − δσ(1 − γ)Π(t) < 0
since
lim
g−>∞Θ(p,g)=−σ(1 − γ)(2p − 1) < 0.





(1 + γ)(2p − 1)
¸
=: f(p)
1 ≤ p<∞ implies bs
γ
1+γ ≤ f(p) <b s . Hence, the equation can only be fulﬁlled if 1 <b s≤
1+γ
γ .









b. If p goes to inﬁnity in equation (10’), the condition follows directly.
c. Replace δ by the new variable x = n














Inserting g = 0 yields the condition in the Lemma.

















limg−>∞ Rg =l i m g−>∞ ˜ Rg = F>0.
39Proof of Proposition 1 With ﬂat hierarchy, we showed that the Π-curve is monotonically increasing,
and so an equilibrium is only possible with p>1. It remains to show that the R-curve monotonically
decreasing if bs ≤ 1, which would guarantee uniqueness. Lemma 2b. says that R approaches ˆ g,




. The right hand side of the latter expression is a convex function
in g and must therefore have a positive slope at g =ˆ g.T h u s , F − bs
2 ∆e−ˆ g∆ > 0. But this implies
Rg = F − bs







STRUCTURAL CHANGE 1870-1984 
(sectoral employment as a fraction of total employment) 
   France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  U.K.  U.S.  Average 
Agriculture 1870   49.2   49.5   67.5   37.0   22.7   50.0   46.0 
  1913   37.4   34.6   64.3   26.5   11.0   32.3   34.4 
  1950   28.5   22.2   48.3   13.9    5.1   13.0   21.8 
  1984  7.6   5.5   8.9  4.9   2.6   3.3  5.5 
               
Industry  1870   27.8   28.7   13.8   29.0   42.3   24.4   27.7 
  1913   33.8   37.8   13.9   33.8   44.8   29.3   32.2 
  1950   34.8   43.0   22.6   40.2   46.5   33.3   36.7 
  1984   32.0   40.5   34.8   26.4   32.4   28.0   32.4 
               
Services  1870   23.0   21.8   18.7   34.0   35.0   25.6   26.4 
  1913   28.8   27.6   21.8   39.7   44.2   38.4   33.4 
  1950   36.7   34.8   29.1   45.9   48.4   53.7   41.4 
  1984   60.4   54.0   56.3   68.7   65.0   68.7   62.2 
 
Source: Maddison (1984) 
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Default Parameter values: 
 






   
 
 
 
  
 